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Abstract
The recent proliferation of referendums on sovereignty matters has
fuelled growing scholarly interest. However, comparative research is hin-
dered by the weaknesses of current compilations, which tend to suﬀer
from conceptual vagueness, varied coding decisions, incomplete coverage
and ad-hoc categorisations. Based on an improved conceptualisation and
theory-driven typology, we present a new dataset of 602 sovereignty ref-
erendums between 17762012, more than double the number in existing
lists. In an exploratory analysis, we uncover eight distinctive clusters of
sovereignty referendums and identify patterns of activity over time and
space as well as outcomes produced.
1
Introduction1
The referendum device plays an increasingly prominent role in what arguably
constitutes the most fundamental of all political questions: the determination
of the territorial contours of a polity. Three of the four newest additions to
the international systemEast Timor, Montenegro and South Sudanwere le-
gitimised via referendums, while the remaining fourthKosovohad already
voted on its sovereignty nearly two decades before it declared independence
in 2008. More recently, the referendum held in Crimea in March 2014 paved
the way for Russia's controversial annexation of the (former) Ukrainian territ-
ory. Analogous referendums held shortly thereafter in Ukraine's Donbas region
have failed to achieve their aspiration, at least to date. Advanced democracies
have not been immune to the phenomenon either. Scotland has just rejected
independence in one of the most widely followed sovereignty referendums ever,
while Catalonia has just endorsed secession from Spain, though upon a low
turnout. Nor are there any signs of the phenomenon coming to an end. Among
others, referendums on sovereignty continue to be on the agenda in the break-
away region of Nagorno-Karabakh (on its relations with Azerbaijan), in New
Caledonia (on independence) and in the UK (on continued EU membership).
The increasing prominence of the sovereignty referendum has led to sig-
niﬁcant scholarly attention. Legal work, for one, has focused on the consti-
tutional regulation of sovereignty referendums and whether a customary norm
has emerged requiring a referendum before a territorial change.2 Political philo-
1Acknowledgements: Earlier versions of this paper have been presented at the 2013
Colloque sur la pratique référendaire et l'idéal démocratique européen in Clemont-Ferrand,
the 2014 ECPR general conference in Glasgow and the 2015 PSA in Sheﬃeld. Many thanks
for all constructive comments received. We especially would like to thank Nicolas Aubert,
Andreas Auer, Corsin Bisaz, Matt Qvortrup, Mario Mendez, Beat Müller, Uwe Serdült and
Jonathan Wheatley for their input as well as the reviewers and the editor for their helpful
suggestions. The research presented in this article has been supported by the Swiss National
Science Foundation, grant no. 10001A_135127. The data set, codebook and replication
codes can be downloaded from this journal's Dataverse. Updates will be made available on
the project website at http://www.contestedsovereignty.com.
2On matters of constitutional regulation see e.g. Choudhry & Howse (2000); Sen (2015);
Tierney (2009, 2013). On the requirement for a referendum before territorial changes see e.g.
Peters (1995); Radan (2012); Rudrakumaran (1989).
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sophers, on the other hand, have investigated the implications of democratic
theory for the desirability and/or the conduct of referendums on sovereignty,
often with a focus on referendums on secession.3 The phenomenon has not
escaped the more empirically-oriented political scientists, either. Often with a
focus on a single or a small set of cases, scholars have investigated the individual-
level determinants of vote choice, highlighting factors such as national identity4,
risk propensity5, supranationalisation6 and campaign eﬀects.7 Work with a
broader comparative perspective includes research on the circumstances under
which sovereignty referendums are held8, on questions related to the design of
sovereignty referendums9, on referendums generated by the process of European
integration10 and on the consequences of sovereignty referendums, particularly
in terms of conﬂict resolution.11
An indispensable prerequisite for research on sovereignty referendums, es-
pecially of the comparative kind, is to get the historical record right. How-
ever, existing compilations tend to suﬀer from conceptual vagueness, question-
able coding decisions, incomplete coverage and largely ad-hoc categorisations
of the disparate phenomenon (section one). In this paper, we present a freshly
collected data set that attempts to address these concerns: Contested Sover-
eignty: A Global Compilation of Sovereignty Referendums, 17762012. The
Contested Sovereignty data set is based on an improved conceptualisation of
the sovereignty referendum (section two). Furthermore, we introduce a two-
dimensional typology that allows for a more theory-driven categorisation of
the widely disparate phenomenon.12 Drawing on a much richer set of sources
3E.g. Beran (1984); Birch (1984); Buchanan (2004); Heraclides (1997); Oklopcic (2012).
4Denver (2002).
5Clarke et al. (2004); Nadeau et al. (1999).
6Dardanelli (2005).
7Pammett & LeDuc (2001).
8E.g. Muñoz & Guinjoan (2013); Qvortrup (2014); Rourke et al. (1992); Walker (2003).
9Beigbeder (1994); Bogdanor (1981); Farley (1986); Goodhart (1981); Laponce (2001,
2004, 2010); Loizides (2014).
10Hug (2002); Hobolt (2009); Mendez et al. (2014); Oppermann (2013).
11Farley (1986); He (2002); Mac Ginty (2003); Laponce (2001, 2004, 2010, 2012); Lee &
Mac Ginty (2012); Qvortrup (2014); Thompson (1989); Wheatley (2012).
12In addition the data set includes information on ballot questions, referendum outcomes
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(section three), the Contested Sovereignty data set identiﬁes 602 sovereignty
referendums between 1776 and 2012, thus signiﬁcantly extending existing com-
pilations which feature a maximum of about 230 cases. In an exploratory
analysis on the basis of this new data set (section four) we map the diﬀusion
of the sovereignty referendum over time and space, thus unravelling some of
the dynamics in terms of distinct clusters, patterns of usage and outcomes pro-
duced. The discussion in the ﬁnal section wraps up the argument and suggests
possible directions for future research.
1 A Critique of the State-of-the-Art
Over the years there have been repeated attempts at mapping the world-wide
experience with the sovereignty referendum. One of the most oft-cited histor-
ical examples is the collection by Wambaugh.13 Now outdated, Wambaugh's
work served as a useful reference source for later attempts at covering the ﬁeld.14
Another milestone came with the work by Butler and Ranney.15 Whether impli-
citly16 or explicitly17, later work builds heavily on Butler and Ranney's eﬀorts.
Presently, the most up-to-date lists have identiﬁed roughly 230 sovereignty ref-
erendums, starting with the oft-discussed `ﬁrst' sovereignty referendum of the
modern era in Avignon and Comtat Venaissin held in 179118 (which in reality
was not the modern era's ﬁrst sovereignty referendum; for more on this see
below) and ending with the 2012 referendum on Puerto Rico's future relations
with the U.S.19
However, existing compilations of sovereignty referendums suﬀer from at
and the geographical and political context wherein referendums were held.
13Wambaugh (1920, 1933).
14E.g. Goodhart (1971).
15Butler & Ranney (1978, 1994b). Note that Butler and Ranney cover referendums in
general and not only sovereignty referendums.
16Sussman (2006); Qvortrup (2012, 2014).
17He (2002); Laponce (2010); Peters (1995).
18See e.g. Goodhart (1971, 1981); Laponce (2004).
19The most recent attempts at covering the ﬁeld include Laponce (2010); Qvortrup (2012,
2014).
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least four major problems. We look at each in turn. First, there is considerable
conceptual muddiness around the sovereignty referendum. This starts with the
many terms in use to tag what on the practical level largely coincides with our
conception of the sovereignty referendum20, including `referendums on territ-
orial issues'21, `plebiscites'22, `ethnonational referendums'23 and `referendums
on the boundary/identity question.'24 Of course, the use of alternative labels
for the same or similar concepts is not necessarily a problem as long as the core
concepts are properly deﬁned. But unfortunately, all too often scholars pay
rather scant attention to basic deﬁnitional issues.25 Sussman26, for instance,
deﬁnes sovereignty referendums as characterised by the participation of the
demos in determining the shape of the polis or the nature of its sovereigntya
rather ambiguous statement that arguably is too lofty to generate replicable
coding decisions.27 Auer et al.28 may be clearer, but nonetheless seem to avoid
the deﬁnitional issue when they deﬁne sovereignty referendums by enumerating
the range of possible cases: popular consultations relating to the independence
of states, territorial modiﬁcations, self-determination of a decentralised com-
munity or accession of a state to a supranational organisation.29 Perhaps the
most extreme case, however, is Laponce who in his book-length treatise on sov-
ereignty referendums does not bother deﬁning the concept at all.30 Evidently
Laponce seems to assume that the concept of the sovereignty referendum is
self-evident. It is not, of course, and indeed concepts never are and should
20In addition to ourselves, Laponce (2001, 2004, 2010, 2012), Sen (2015) and Sussman
(2006) also use the term `sovereignty referendum'. LeDuc (2003) uses a similar terminology
as well.
21E.g. Butler & Ranney (1994a). Peters (1995) uses a similar terminology.
22Especially in the historical literature (see e.g. Mattern, 1920; Wambaugh, 1920, 1933)
as well as some of the contemporary, international law-inspired literature.
23Qvortrup (2012, 2014).
24He (2002).
25See Peters (1995) for a notable exception.
26Sussman (2006).
27In addition, Sussman (2006) fails to distinguish between referendums on the territorial
and non-territorial boundaries of the polity, as most scholars at least implicitly do (see below).
28Auer et al. (2006).
29See LeDuc (2003) for a similar, enumerative approach.
30Laponce (2010).
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always be clearly delimited.31
The conceptual muddiness aicting existing compilations has led to varied
coding decisionsthe second major issue. Sussman32 may be instructive here
since he counts South Africa's 1992 referendum on ending the Apartheid sys-
tem as a sovereignty referendum. While this referendum undoubtedly aﬀected
the nature of the polity in that it asked whether non-Whites should be given
equal political rights, most scholars would not classify South Africa (1992) as
a sovereignty referendum. Another example is the case of supranational entit-
ies. Scholars have disagreed on whether referendums related to the formation
of supranational entities, in particular the EU or NATO, should be considered
sovereignty referendums. Some33 have taken a negative view while others34
argue that at least EU-related referendums should be counted.
Third, existing compilations suﬀer from incomplete coverage. While con-
ceptual ambiguity could play its part here, too, the most important reason for
this is the typical focus on a small selection of seminal works35 and the lack
of original research. Thus, omissions replicate over time. For instance, Wam-
baugh, one of the most oft-cited reference for historic cases, explicitly omits all
referendums from the U.S. context.36 As a result, today's compilations miss
out much of the American experience (see below).
Fourth, there have been manifold attempts to classify the disparate phe-
nomenon of the sovereignty referendum. One danger with this is that scholars
generate proliferating but incompatible typologies. For instance, the extent to
which Laponce's37 ﬁve types of sovereignty referendums (transfer, union, sep-
aration, restricted sovereignty and status quo) overlap with Sussman's38 six
categories (independence celebration, border dispute settlement, status, sov-
31Goertz (2006).
32Sussman (2006).
33E.g. Laponce (2010); Peters (1995).
34E.g. Butler & Ranney (1994a); Qvortrup (2012, 2014).
35In particular Wambaugh (1920, 1933) and Butler & Ranney (1978, 1994b).
36Wambaugh (1920, p. 9).
37Laponce (2010).
38Sussman (2006).
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ereignty transfer, downsizing and upsizing) is not immediately clear. More
problematic, however, is that most typologies are largely inductive enterprises
and thus rather ad-hoc. Among the few notable exceptions is Qvortrup's39 clas-
siﬁcation scheme. However, his approach can only encompass referendums that
involve ethnic conﬂict and, as Qvortrup himself recognises, not all sovereignty
referendums do. Thus there is a need for a theory-driven typology that allows
for the categorisation of all sovereignty referendums.
2 A New Framework for Analysis
The Concept of the Sovereignty Referendum
As argued above, a more precise deﬁnition of the concept of the sovereignty
referendum is in order. Since the sovereignty referendum is a subset of the
more general category of the referendum, we naturally start with a deﬁnition of
the `referendum'. What constitutes a referendum is not self-evident. The term
is sometimes used to refer solely to binding votes on issues while non-binding
votes are sometimes referred to as consultations or polls. In other cases a
distinction is made between popular votes on proposals put forward by the
government and those resulting from `initiatives' on the part of the citizenry
(particularly in the Swiss context or in certain U.S. states). The deﬁnition we
propose is relatively ﬂexible and encompassing, and thereby follows the practice
of leading comparativists on referendums.40 Speciﬁcally, we use the concept
of the referendum to refer to any popular vote on an issue of policy that is
organised by the state or at least by a state-like entity, such as the authorities
of a de-facto state.
The concept of the referendum deﬁned as such includes both binding and
consultative votes. It also includes votes on government proposals as well as
citizen's initiatives. It includes both oﬃcial and unoﬃcial (illegal) votes, such
39Qvortrup (2012, 2014).
40E.g. Butler & Ranney (1994b).
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as the independence referendums held in the Baltics in early 1991. Moreover,
the way in which a popular vote is expressed is irrelevant. That is to say, it
does not matter whether an issue is voted via the ballot box or, for instance,
in a town hall meeting (e.g. a Landsgemeinde in the Swiss case).41 Critically,
however, this deﬁnition excludes elections to a representative body, even if the
sole purpose of this body is to make decisions on sovereignty matters. Thus
we do not, for instance, include the 1863 vote on the Ionian Islands' merger
with Greece. Though often counted as a sovereignty referendum42, the Ionian
case actually involved an election to appoint delegates to a representative body
charged with deciding the matter.43 Nor, to give another example, do we in-
clude the 1991 presidential elections in Chechnya, even if they clearly served to
legitimate the secessionist regime.44
Having deﬁned the term referendum, the question remains how to delimit
the subject matter of referendums on sovereignty. We deﬁne a sovereignty ref-
erendum as a direct popular vote on a reallocation of sovereignty between at
least two territorial centres. We would argue that most scholars have such an
implicit understanding when speaking of a sovereignty referendum45, although
the tendency has been to avoid specifying the underlying concept. Following
this deﬁnition, sovereignty referendums must involve at a minimum a dyadic
shift in the locus of sovereign rights between two territorial centres. Seces-
sion constitutes a typical example of such a dyadic shift given that it involves
the reallocation of sovereignty from a country's capital to a regional centre.
Sovereignty reallocations may implicate more than two territorial centres; for
instance, the 1971 referendum on the proposed union of Libya, Egypt and Syria
involved three territorial centres and thus a triadic reallocation.
This leaves yet another issue: what do we understand by `sovereignty'?
41This is especially important for accommodating many of the historical cases.
42E.g. Laponce (2010); Qvortrup (2012, 2014).
43Goodhart 1971, pp. 132134; Wambaugh 1920, p. 122-132.
44Hughes 2001, p. 29.
45This includes alternative labels, such as referendums on territorial issues.
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Sovereignty is a notoriously muddled concept and varying deﬁnitions abound.46
While most scholars would agree that sovereignty entails decision-making power,
supremacy and territoriality, there is less agreement on the absolute or non-
absolute nature of sovereignty.47 A traditional understanding à la Bodin and
Hobbes envisions sovereignty as absolute, understood as extending uncondition-
ally to all matters within a given territory. In contrast, many contemporary
theorists have argued that absolute sovereignty is an illusion that should be
broken with.48 Keohane49, for instance, has argued that sovereignty is best
conceived as a variable, not a constant. According to the latter view an au-
thority may be sovereign with regard to some matters but not others. The EU
constitutes a good example, as it has ultimate decision-making powers with re-
gards to some matters (e.g. trade) but not others (e.g. defence). Our approach
dovetails that of most existing sovereignty referendum collections, which tend
to include referendums on, say, the creation of an autonomous region. More
speciﬁcally, in line with a non-absolute conception we deﬁne sovereignty broadly
as the right to make authoritative political decisions within a territorial unit.
However, we require that core competencies of the state are at stake, for in-
stance in the economic, cultural or security realms. Therefore referendums on
municipal authority, purely administrative decentralisation or other small-scale
reallocations of authority are not included.50
Two additional points are worth emphasising. First, note that a clear deﬁn-
ition of sovereignty helps resolve the above-mentioned controversy on whether
EU-related referendums should be counted as sovereignty referendums. As-
suming a non-absolute conception of sovereignty (as most scholars, including
ourselves, have at least implicitly done), it is hard to think of a good reason not
to include them, given that the EU does have supreme authority over certain
46Krasner (1999).
47Philpott (1995).
48Keohane (2003); Krasner (1999); Philpott (1995).
49Keohane (2003).
50See the codebook for additional details on operational rules.
9
core competencies of the state, including trade. A similar argument applies to
referendums related to NATO in the realm of security.
Second, the sovereignty referendum has a close relation to what is known
as the `boundary' or the `demos' problem in political philosophy: the question
of `who' constitutes the polity and is hence legitimately entitled to decide.51
Indeed, some authors have explicitly52 or at least implicitly53 deﬁned the sov-
ereignty referendum as referendums on the boundary question. However, the
boundary terminology can be misleading and lead to coding confusion unless
its territorial component is speciﬁed. Most scholars would not consider refer-
endums on non-territorial boundaries of the polity as sovereignty referendums.
This gives rise to an important analytical distinction based on the minimum
dyadic shift criterion. A couple of examples should help illustrate this point.
Without any doubt, the 1971 referendum in Switzerland on extending voting
rights to women had momentous implications for `who' constitutes the demos
and governs. But it does not involve a reallocation of sovereignty between min-
imally two territorial centres. Similarly, South Africa's 1992 referendum on
ending White-only rulewhich Sussman54 counts as a sovereignty referendum
(see above)clearly aﬀected the boundaries of the polity, but lacks a territ-
orial component. On the other hand, the 1978 referendum in Spain, which also
marked a transition to democracy, did incorporate a signiﬁcant territorial real-
location by setting up an asymmetrical, proto-federal system. This latter case
would, therefore, satisfy the minimum dyadic shift criterion. Again, using the
minimum dyadic criterion can help resolve controversies about case inclusion
that many referendum scholars have followed implicitly.
51Dahl (1990); also see Loughlin & Walker (2007) and in particular Tierney (2007).
52He (2002)
53Sussman (2006).
54Sussman (2006).
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Typology
The typology we propose ﬂows smoothly from our conceptualisation of the
sovereignty referendum and classiﬁes the phenomenon according to the type of
sovereignty reallocation at stake. To that end, as with most of the literature55
the typology is based on a sub-classiﬁcation of the subject matter. Speciﬁcally,
we argue that two dimensions in combination provide a meaningful description
of any sovereignty reallocation: (1) the scope of the sovereignty shift and (2)
the logic of the sovereignty shift. Each is discussed in turn.
The scope dimension parts from the observation that sovereignty needs to
be unbundled rather than treated as an all or nothing proposition.56 To this
end, we build on Keohane's57 concept of the gradations of sovereignty to identify
three principles of sovereignty that can be at stake: full, partial and pooled sov-
ereignty. Figure 1 illustrates the scope dimension and the level of territoriality
to which the three sovereignty principles pertain.
[Figure 1 about here]
Full sovereignty relates to the classic conception of sovereignty underpinning
the modern state. It involves what Krasner58 referred to as international legal
sovereignty (i.e. international recognition). At least in its ideal-type form, it
also involves full internal supremacy and external or Westphalian sovereignty
(i.e. the principle of non-intervention in internal aﬀairs), though in practice
both can and indeed are often compromised.59
Partial sovereignty derives from the gradation logic and the reality that
there are alternative conﬁgurations of sovereignty that fall short of the classical
ideal. As Keohane argues, there is no reason why sovereignty must inhere in
a single centre since it can be dispersed among governmental entities as in a
55For exceptions see Laponce (2010, pp. 5573); Scelle (1934).
56Keohane (2003); Krasner (1999); Philpott (1995).
57Keohane (2003).
58Krasner (1999, 2004).
59Keohane (2003); Krasner (1999, 2004).
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federal system.60 The partial sovereignty enjoyed by a territory such as the
Basque Country in Spain constitutes a good example. Neither international
legal nor Westphalian principles of sovereignty are at stake in referendums
pertaining to partial sovereignty. Instead, the question is whether the national
centre should limit its internal supremacy by granting limited sovereignty to
one or more sub-state entities.
Finally, pooled sovereignty involves what Keohane and Krasner refer to as
the parcelling out of elements of domestic authority to supranational struc-
tures, such as the EU or NATO.61 Pooled sovereignty institutions do not aﬀect
international legal sovereignty: its members remain internationally recognised
states. However, the pooling of sovereignty imposes constraints on member
states' internal and Wesphalian sovereignty: the supranational authorities en-
joy the right to intervene in some of the member states' internal aﬀairs.
Whereas our scope dimension relates to the material notion of the aspects
of sovereignty at stake, our second overarching dimensionthe logic of a sover-
eignty referendumis concerned with the ideational or the identitarian dimen-
sion of a referendum. It incorporates a directional element and describes the
shift in identities, loyalties and expectations implied in any given reallocation
of sovereign authority. A sovereignty shift can take two distinct logics: integ-
rative or disintegrative. An integrative logic refers to the dynamic whereby
political actors in one or more political (sub-)systems are persuaded to shift
their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new centre which
then acquires overall jurisdiction (e.g. uniﬁcation).62 A disintegrative logic, on
the other hand, operates in the opposite direction and refers to the dynamic
whereby political actors in one or more subsystems withdraw their loyalties, ex-
pectations and political activities from a jurisdictional centre and either focus
them on a centre of their own (e.g. secession) or on an external centre, such as
60Keohane (2003).
61Keohane (2003); Krasner (2004, 2005).
62This deﬁnition of political integration draws on Haas (1958).
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a cultural motherland.63
[Figure 2 about here]
Combining the two dimensions (scope and logic) yields a total of six categor-
ies (see Figure 2). It is possible to further disaggregate the typology with two
types within each of the six broad categories. Due to word constraints we will
not deﬁne each type presently. Instead, we will uncover illustrative examples
of the various types in the exploratory analysis that follows.64 Before moving
on, two further points should be clariﬁed. First, one of the types is a theor-
etical case. No empirical examples exist for the `supranational repatriation'
typethough cases could be forthcoming if for instance a member state voted
on leaving the eurozone (e.g. Greece). Second, in terms of the two overarch-
ing dimensions there is a special class of sovereignty referendums that involves
multiple options. If a referendum involves more than one option other than the
status quo, it may not be possible to classify a referendum's scope and/or logic.
For instance, the 2012 vote in Puerto Rico involved several options ranging
from statehood (partial sovereignty and integrative logic) to full independence
(full sovereignty and disintegrative logic). Hence both the referendum's scope
and logic are mixed in such a case.65
3 Data Collection and Coding
The coding exercise involved three successive steps. In a ﬁrst step, we drew
up the putative universe of cases. Existing compilations of sovereignty refer-
endums represented a natural starting point.66 We complemented them with
compilations of referendums more generally.67 Coverage of the latter is excellent
63This understanding of political disintegration builds on Wood (1981).
64See the codebook for more detailed deﬁnitions.
65Across the entire dataset this category of multi-option referendums applies to less than
5 per cent of cases.
66Including Laponce (2010); Qvortrup (2012, 2014); Wambaugh (1920, 1933); Peters
(1995); He (2002).
67Including Butler & Ranney (1978, 1994b); Centre for Research on Direct Democracy
(2011); Suchmaschine fuer direkte Demokratie (2014).
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regarding referendums at the national level with systematic searches revealing
a number of cases that were missing from existing lists. However, they remain
more limited when it comes to sub-national referendums, in particular unoﬃcial
or semi-oﬃcial referendums and historical cases.
Three main strategies helped us overcome this weakness.68 First, we searched
encyclopaedias of ethnic separatism69 and the Minorities at Risk Project's on-
line resources70 to get fuller coverage of sovereignty referendums in the context
of ethnic self-determination conﬂicts. Second, we surveyed some of the less well-
known older literature on the topic.71 Third, noting that we still systematically
missed referendums from the U.S. context, we searched seminal historical work
on the creation of the American Union.72
Having identiﬁed the putative universe of sovereignty referendum cases, the
next crucial step was to check whether an instance conformed to our operational
deﬁnition of the sovereignty referendum. This coding exercise was performed
independently by the research team. Agreement among coders was generally
high and disagreements were resolved by consensus, usually by gathering more
case-speciﬁc information. In a smaller number of cases, external experts were
consulted for reconciling coding decisions, e.g. on certain cases from the Soviet
Union.
After resolving case inclusion, the ﬁnal step involved the addition of context
information, including the sovereignty referendum type, the regional and polit-
ical context wherein a referendum was held, the ballot question, turnout and
yes-share.73 For this we drew on the above-mentioned sources, often in combin-
ation with case-speciﬁc literature. In addition, we drew on information from
the Correlates of War (COW) project for the aﬃliations of territorial units.74
68In addition, we browsed news sources and consulted other types of academic literature.
69Hewitt & Cheetham (2000); Minahan (2002).
70Minorities at Risk Project (2009).
71E.g. Fauchille (1925); Freudenthal (1891); Gawenda (1946); Giroud (1920); Kunz (1961);
Mattern (1920); Rouard de Card, Edgar (1890); Scelle (1934).
72Including Chiorazzi & Most (2005); Shearer (2004).
73See the codebook for deﬁnitions of extra variables.
74Correlates of War Project (2011); Sarkees & Wayman (2010).
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Disagreements were again resolved by consensus.
4 Exploratory Analysis
The resulting dataset contains a total of 602 sovereignty referendums between
17762012, more than double the number of cases identiﬁed in existing collec-
tions.75 Figure 3 presents a summary of referendum activity over time. An
initial observation is that the number of sovereignty referendums has increased
tremendously over time. Moreover, the ﬁgure reveals a number of distinctive
peaks. Previous work has identiﬁed ﬁve such waves (or high tides) of sover-
eignty referendums.76 These have generally coincided with moments of massive
geo-political upheaval in the international system, such as the collapse of em-
pires or world war. For example, the French Revolution triggered a spate of
referendums as did the Treaty of Versailles in 1919.
[Figure 3 about here]
Since it implies a concentration of referendum activity at a particular tem-
poral juncture, the deﬁning feature of a wave relates to its temporality. Many
referendum compilations have drawn on the wave concept. However, we prefer
to think in terms of clusters of referendum activity, deﬁned as sets of sovereignty
referendums related to broad macro-historical processes. Referendum clusters
as deﬁned may involve a narrow temporal scope, but can also be longer drawn
out. Moreover, diﬀerent clusters can also overlap. For instance, our ﬁrst cluster,
which broadly relates to the formation of the U.S., overlaps temporally with
several other clusters, including our second cluster (the French Revolution).
75Note that there is a count issue. While past practice has not always been consistent, we
follow what seems to have been the general rule and identify sovereignty referendums by the
territorial entity voting on a matter of sovereignty. Sovereignty referendums thus identiﬁed
are not always fully independent events, however. For instance, the 1958 vote on the creation
of the United Arab Republic is coded as two sovereignty referendums, one in Egypt and the
other in Syria. The Contested Sovereignty data set allows to collapse such separately coded
referendums with a common institutional wrapper to a single referendum event. The 602
referendums in our data set make up 499 unique referendum events.
76Sussman (2006); also see Laponce (2010); Qvortrup (2012).
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Overall, we have identiﬁed a total of 8 broad clusters of referendum use, which
together account for almost 90 per cent of the referendum activity.77 Table 1
presents the clusters and their overall frequencies drawing on our sovereignty
referendum typology. In the section below we discuss each cluster in turn.
[Table 1 about here]
Clusters of Referendum Activity
(1) U.S. Polity Creation: The ﬁrst cluster relates to the formation of the
United States. With more than one hundred referendums, it is the second
largest (see Table 1). Most of these referendums were overlooked in exist-
ing lists. The U.S. cluster includes what actually was the modern era's ﬁrst
sovereignty referendum (rather than the oft-mentioned Avignon referendum):
Massachusetts' 1776 referendum on declaring independence.78 Somewhat sur-
prisingly, only one `uniﬁcation' referendum was held to ratify the constitution
that gave birth to the modern American union. This contrasts with other clas-
sic federations, such as Switzerland or Australia, where multiple referendums
were held. The only referendum on the uniﬁcation of the U.S., an integrative
type referendum according to our typology, took place in Rhode Island in 1788.
The outcome was actually a `no' votethough Rhode Island did eventually join
the federation via an alternative ratiﬁcation route that avoided the referendum.
In contrast, there were comparatively numerous referendums associated with
the most unstable period in the formation of the U.S. polity: the attempted
secession of the pro-slavery Southern states that led to the American Civil
War (1861-1865). A total of ﬁve states voted on leaving the American union,
77Some cases could be seen as forming part of more than one cluster. For instance,
Puerto Rico's 1967, 1998 and 2012 referendums on its future relations with the U.S. could
be attributed to both the U.S. and the decolonisation cluster. We avoided double-assigning
referendums. The three Puerto Rican cases were assigned to the U.S. cluster since Puerto
Rico can be considered decolonised by the early 1950s and since all three referendums involved
the question of statehood (and thus full integration into the U.S.).
78In terms of the ﬁrst referendums, according to some authors it is possible to go further
back to the Middle Ages for evidence of sovereignty referendums; see e.g. Solière (1901).
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including Texas, North Carolina and Virginia. Interestingly, voters rejected
independence both in North Carolina and in Tennessee.79
However, the majority of referendums in the U.S. cluster, accounting for
almost two thirds of activity, relate to what we term `incorporation'. These are
referendums on partial sovereignty that involve an integrative logic: they are
associated with the expansion of the original 13 states to incorporate ever more
territories into the union. Examples of the most recent, successful statehood
referendums occurred in the late 1950s when Hawaii and Alaska attained state-
hood. Indeed, most of the territories that have acceded to the union after its
constitutive moment have held popular votes on their incorporation. In some
cases a single vote was suﬃcient (e.g. California in 1849) while in others mul-
tiple votes were required because of opposition against statehood within the
territory itself (e.g. Iowa80) or due to opposition in Washington (e.g. Utah81).
The second biggest set of votes in the U.S. cluster constitutes what we call
`sub-state splits': referendums on the splitting up of autonomous territories
or states. These referendums relate to partial sovereignty and involve a dis-
integrative logic. Maine makes up for a fair share having voted 7 times on
its separation from Massachusetts before attaining separate statehood in 1820.
Other cases in this category include the referendums on the split of the two
Dakotas and on West Virginia's separation from Virginia in the context of the
Civil War. States can also mergea `sub-state merger'although in the U.S.
context this type of referendum is relatively rare and we only came across Ari-
zona and New Mexico's failed attempt in 1906. The diﬀerence between the
`sub-state merger' type and the `sub-state split' type is that the logic is integ-
rative rather than disintegrative. Lastly, the expansion of the U.S. has triggered
a number of `multi-option' referendums in associated territories as they seek to
clarify their status and relationship with the federation, including the series of
79Though in Tennessee, a second plebiscite held four months later approved independence.
80Roba (2004).
81It took Utah 7 attempts, 6 referendums and more than 50 years to attain statehood,
mainly due to Washington's suspicions against the Mormon sect; see McCormick (2004).
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votes in Puerto Rico.
(2) French Revolution: The prevailing opinion in the literature has been
that the practice of the sovereignty referendum begins with the French Revolu-
tion, where the principle of self-determination is said to have originated.82 As
has been shown, the ﬁrst sovereignty referendums were actually held in the U.S.
Nevertheless, France's post-revolutionary governments' use of the referendum
device did much to further its appeal. This is despite the fact that the number
of referendums in this cluster is relatively limited (13) and that the tool was
mainly used as a means to legitimate territorial expansion. A doctrine of `no
annexation without the consultation of the inhabitants' managed to combine
the foreign policy goals of the revolutionary movement with the prevailing the-
ories of popular sovereignty.83 Post-revolutionary France staged the ﬁrst such
annexation referendum in 1791 in the previously cited Avignon and Comtat
Venaissin, then part of the Papal States. In our classiﬁcation scheme, this is an
integrative `transfer' case since it involves i) a reallocation of full sovereignty
from the Papal States to France and ii) a shift of loyalties and expectations
towards a new centre (in this case towards Paris).84 The following years saw
similar referendums in Savoy, Nice and Monaco, amongst others. However,
with the advent of Napoleon the device was abandoned.
(3) Mid-nineteenth Century Nation-state Formation in Europe: Eu-
rope did not see further referendums on sovereignty until the idea was revived
by the national movements in Switzerland and Italy between 1848 and 1870.
A total of 43 referendums were held during this period of foundational state
82See e.g. Goodhart (1971, 1981); Laponce (2004).
83Mattern (1920); Wambaugh (1920).
84Note that the integrative and disintegrative logics collide in case of cessions (i.e. in
cases when a unit separates from one state to join another). Yet typically one of the two
logics is more important. If, as in the case of Avignon and Comtat Venaissin, a territory
is militarily conquered, the integrative logic is arguably stronger, thus we would speak of
a `transfer' referendum. If, as in some of the cases discussed below, the primary impetus
for a referendum comes from a separatist movement, we consider the disintegrative logic as
dominant and would speak of an `irredentist separation' referendum. See the codebook for
more details.
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creation with 23 referendums related to the Swiss case and 20 referendums as-
sociated with the creation of modern Italy. Whereas the foundational moment
of the Swiss confederation was a relatively swift aﬀair, which took place after
a civil war and was settled by a series of referendums in 1848, Italian uniﬁca-
tion was a longer drawn-out process that culminated in 1870. The referendums
in this cluster invariably relate to full sovereignty, while the dominant logic is
integrative since loyalties and expectations are refocused externally towards a
new centre. Most of the referendums were `uniﬁcation' referendums on the mer-
ger of states or `transfer' referendums on the merger of a territory with another
state.85
(4) Post-First World War: Following the Italian Risorgimento, Europe did
not witness much activity until the referendum re-emerged as a device for re-
drawing territorial borders in the aftermath of the First World War.86 With
only 18 cases, this cluster is among the smallest. Nonetheless, it includes some
of the most widely discussed cases. These occurred in the context of the post-
Versailles settlements and the famous enunciation of the Wilsonian doctrine
of self-determination87, though it should be noted that the referendum device
was used highly selectively by the Allied Powers.88 Many of the referendums
in the post-World War One cluster were what we call `transfer' referendums
on border delimitations between nation-states, often stipulated by the Ver-
sailles Treaty. In particular, this includes the celebrated 1920 referendums in
Schleswig (on joining Denmark or Germany) and Upper Silesia 1921 (on joining
Poland or Germany). Other `transfer' cases were connected to the dismantling
of the Austro-Hungarian empire, such as Klagenfurt Basin (1920) or Sopron
85A small subset of referendums had a disintegrative logic. For instance, separat-
ist/irredentist movements in Lombardy and Venice, at the time anchored within the Austro-
Hungarian empire, each staged referendums on integration with Italy in 1848.
86There were only two referendums in Europe after 1870 and before the end of the First
World War: the 1905 `independence' referendum in Norway discussed below and the 1916
referendum in Denmark on the cession of the American Virgin Islands to the U.S.
87Laponce (2010); Qvortrup (2012, 2014).
88Plebiscites were rejected, for instance, in the Sudetenland and Alsace-Lorraine. See
Bogdanor (1981); Qvortrup (2014).
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(1921). It should be mentioned that this cluster also includes cases of `irre-
dentist separation', including Voralberg's attempt to secede from Austria and
join Switzerland in 1919 and Tyrol's 1921 referendum on joining Germany. Ex-
cept for one case89 all the referendums were spatially concentrated in Europe
and most occurred between 1919 and 1923. However, since they are connected
to the ripple eﬀects of the Versailles settlement, this cluster also includes the
1935 referendum in the Saar and the 1938 Anschluss referendum on Germany's
merger with Austriaheld after Hitler had already occupied Austria in the
preceding months.
(5) Decolonisation: The end of the Second World War and the ever-wider
consensus that the principle of self-determination extends to non-Whites trig-
gered another wave of referendums related to the decolonisation process.90 The
decolonisation cluster contains 123 cases, easily the largest of our clusters. It is
also the most diverse in terms of geography, with referendums in almost every
world region, as well as the type of referendums. Notably, however, the ma-
jority of cases follow the logic of disintegration. Indeed most referendums were
votes on independence held in what now mostly are former European colonies,
especially those of France and the UK. Exemplary cases include the 1962 ref-
erendums in Algeria and mainland France on the former's independence, the
1961 `independence' referendum in Jamaica and the 1958 vote on France's Fifth
Republic constitution, which for the overseas territories eﬀectively amounted
to a referendum on continued French rule.91
Nonetheless, there are also integrative votes in the decolonisation cluster.
The creation of the Federated States of Micronesia in 1978, for instance, in-
volved `uniﬁcation' referendums in six island entities. Moreover, there was a
89The 1918 referendum in Kars, Batum and Ardahan on its aﬃliation with Turkey stipu-
lated by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.
90There had been decolonisation referendums before the Second World War, such as the
1935 referendum in the Philippines on its independence scheme, but their number is very
limited.
91This is counted as 18 referendums as each overseas territory decided for itself. Only one
French Guineavoted against the constitution, which implied immediate independence.
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series of `transfer' votes in world regions such as the Indian subcontinent92 and
Africa.93 Finally, there was also a number of `multi-option' referendums related
to decolonisation, many held in Paciﬁc94 and Caribbean95 islands. Critically,
there is ongoing activity in recent years, albeit with much less intensity. For
instance, there has been a referendum on independence in the UK colony of
Bermuda as recently as 199596 while France's New Caledonia is scheduled to
hold a referendum on independence between 2014 and 2018.
(6) Post-Communism: The fall of Communism in the Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia unleashed another domino wave of sovereignty referendums. With
71 referendums, this constitutes a medium-sized cluster. Apart from being
spatially concentrated in the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union,
referendums in this cluster are distinctive for at least two reasons. First, they
are highly temporally concentrated: almost half of the referendums were held
in 1991 (34) and roughly 85 per cent between 1989 and 1995. This peak is
responsible for the record number of votes in the 1990s (see Figure 3). Still
this cluster is ongoing, as is evidenced by the (out-of-sample) referendums held
2014 in Ukraine's Crimea and Donbas regions.
Second, referendums in this cluster are quite uniform in terms of their logic:
90 per cent of cases followed the logic of disintegration. Admittedly, there were
some referendums with an integrative logic, such as Moldova's 1994 referendum
on joining Romania (which was rejected) and Belarus' 1995 referendum on an
economic union with Russia (which was agreed). Yet the bulk of referendums
were disintegrative in nature, with most relating to either independence or
peripheral irredentism.
One of the most important examples in this cluster includes the all-Union
92E.g. the 1949 referendum in Chandannagar, a former French colony that was transferred
to India thereafter.
93E.g. the referendum in the British Cameroons in 1961 on whether to join Ghana or
Nigeria.
94In particular in the former U.S. Trust Territory of the Paciﬁc Islands.
95In the former Netherlands Antilles.
96Independence was rejected.
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referendum staged by Gorbachev in March 1991, a move that was intended to le-
gitimise the preservation of the Soviet Union. While Gorbachev managed to win
the Union-wide vote comfortably, he severely underestimated the strength of
ethnic secessionism in the Union's West, particularly in the Baltics, Georgia, Ar-
menia and Moldova. Not only did these Republics boycott the referendum, but
Gorbachev's announcement also opened the ﬂoodgate for counter-referendums:
by the end of March, independence votes had been passed in Lithuania, Es-
tonia, Latvia, Georgia and the Western part of Ukraine. Thus Gorbachev's
referendum tactic ended up amplifying rather than calming an already tense
situation that ended with the disintegration of the Union only months later
an event that was notably hastened by another referendum, Ukraine's vote on
independence in December 1991.97
In the case of Yugoslavia, the referendums on independence in Slovenia
(1990) and Croatia (1991) set the stage for the outbreak of the Yugoslav war(s).
Moreover, the Yugoslav context includes some of the most notorious cases of
`irredentist separation' referendums: those staged by Croatia's and Bosnia's
Serb minorities on joining the Serbian motherland.
Not all referendums implied a shift in full sovereignty, however. Some crit-
ical cases were related to partial sovereignty. This includes the 1995 `autonomy'
referendum that helped contain the separatist conﬂict in Gagauzia (a region in
Moldova) as well as the far more divisive and unilaterally staged referendums
on increased autonomy in Crimea and Donetsk in 1994, which were both held
during Ukraine's tumultuous post-independence phase of constitutional bar-
gaining.98
(7) Supranationalisation: The creation of supranational entities, in par-
ticular the EU, has given rise to another cluster of referendum activity. Its
roots go back to the former EC's ﬁrst enlargement round and it began with a
97Brady & Kaplan (1994).
98Crimea had yet another `autonomy' referendum in early 1991 on the restoration of the
Crimean Autonomous Republic.
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curiosity: France's 1972 vote on whether it should allow for EC enlargement
eﬀectively whether the UK should be allowed to enter. Since then a total of
49 votes have been held in the context of supranationalisation, most related
to the EC/EU (43) and some others to NATO (6). In terms of their scope,
all referendums in this cluster are related to the pooling of sovereignty. Most
pertain to the `accession' or the `delegation of powers' to a supranational entity.
As such they tend to follow an integrative logic. Yet there is a small number of
disintegrative referendums, too. Three have taken place thus far, all related to
the withdrawal from supranationational organisations: the UK's continued EC
membership referendum in 1975, Greenland's successful withdrawal from the
EC in 1982 and a Spanish referendum on continued NATO membership in 1986.
As argued above, no referendum on `supranational repatriation' has yet taken
place. Given the increasing political saliency of the EU, referendums related to
the pooling of sovereignty are likely to persist for the foreseeable future.
(8) Devolution and Separatism: In recent decades, the number of ref-
erendums on disintegrative reallocations of sovereignty in the context of self-
determination conﬂicts has increased signiﬁcantly. A number of these referen-
dums has already been grouped within the decolonisation and post-Communism
clusters. However, there are many referendums that follow this dynamic that
are not part of these two clusters and should be grouped together. In fact, with
99 cases this cluster is the third-largest. The ﬁrst case we list in this cluster
is the celebrated referendum on Norway's secession from Sweden in 1905. A
number of referendums followed in the 1930s including an `independence' ref-
erendum in Western Australia and, just before the onset of the Spanish Civil
War, `autonomy' referendums in Galicia, Catalonia and the Basque Country
during the mid-1930s. Yet the bulk of activity in this cluster is distinctly a
post-1970s phenomenon.
More than three quarters of cases involve the question of greater partial sov-
ereignty for a given territory. Most are what we call `autonomy' referendums.
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In addition to the aforementioned Spanish cases, these include Greenland's 1979
referendum on home rule or the repeated referendums on devolution in Scot-
land and Wales ﬁrst in 1979 and then again, successfully, in 1997. Disintegrative
referendums related to partial sovereignty can also take the form of `sub-state
split' referendums, as was the case with the series of referendums generated by
Jura's famous separation from Berne in Switzerland or those on the creation of
a new, Inuit-dominated state in Canada (Nunavut). This cluster also includes
some well-known referendums involving the reallocation of full sovereignty, such
as the above-mentioned case of Norway, but also Quebec's two failed `independ-
ence' referendums in 1980 and 1995 and the successful ones in Eritrea (1993),
East Timor (1999) and South Sudan (2011).
Patterns of Referendum Activity
With the overview of referendum clusters behind us, we are now in a better
position to identify some of the broader patterns of referendum activity over
the past two-and-a-half centuries. Let us begin by looking at the distribution of
types as shown in Figure 4. Among other things this highlights the relative in-
frequency of referendums related to pooled sovereignty and in particular on the
withdrawal from supranational structures. If we take the four categories with
the highest frequencies an interesting picture emerges: whereas the incorpora-
tion and uniﬁcation types are predominantly a pre-1950s and U.S./European
aﬀair, the independence and autonomy referendums are more of a global phe-
nomenon of the post-war period. To get a better handle on such dynamics we
will look at the distribution of referendums over time by region, the logic of the
sovereignty reallocation and the scope of sovereignty at stake, which is shown
in Figures 5, 6 and 7 respectively. All three graphs show annual referendum
frequencies, smoothed for better interpretation.
[Figure 4]
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Taking geographic dispersion ﬁrst, Figure 5 nicely illustrates an important
ﬁnding: for almost two centuries, the sovereignty referendum has largely been
a Western phenomenon.99 In these initial years, a good deal of activity em-
anated from North America where the creation of the U.S. polity generated a
fairly constant ﬂow of referendum activity. Most of the remaining referendums
were held in Europe, though here activity came more in waves (French Revolu-
tion, mid-nineteenth century state formation and post-World War One). In the
aftermath of the Second World War, the sovereignty referendum has become
truly `globalised', largely due to the referendums held in the decolonisation con-
text and its increasing use in non-colonial self-determination conﬂicts across the
globe. At the same time, Europe has seen continued or even increased activity
in recent years, mostly due to referendums in the context of supranationalisa-
tion, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and further cases
of devolution or separatism. On the other hand, activity in North America has
decreased due to the fact that polity formation in the U.S. is coming to an
end.100
[Figures 5, 6 and 7 about here]
In a next step we focus on the sovereignty logic. Figure 6 suggests some
distinctive patterns. Until the post-war period, sovereignty referendums ten-
ded to follow the integrative logic, with notable spikes at the time of France's
post-revolutionary annexations, the uniﬁcations of Italy and Switzerland in the
middle of the nineteenth century and the interwar period redrawing of the
European map. Much of the baseline integrative activity is due to the drawn-
out process of the formation of the American union. However, after 1945 ref-
erendums tended to increasingly follow the logic of disintegration. Essentially,
this is due to three partly overlapping processes: (1) the wave of referendums
99The spike of referendums outside of Europe and North America around the turn of the
nineteenth century is owed to a series of referendums on Australian uniﬁcation.
100Most of the post-Second World War activity in the region emanates from Canada and
Greenland.
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related to decolonisation after the Second World War, (2) the disintegration of
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and (3) the spike of self-determination refer-
endums referred to in our eighth cluster. Although disintegrative activity has
increased, integrative activity has far from ceased and indeed even increased
in recent years as well. This is mainly due to the referendums triggered by
European integration. Finally, Figure 6 points to another recent development:
the emergence of multi-option referendums with mixed logic post-1945, mostly
related to decolonisation.
Turning to the scope of sovereignty at stake, Figure 7 reveals that refer-
endums involving the reallocation of full sovereignty have a constant ebb and
ﬂow over time, with notable peaks during the mid-nineteenth state formation
process and especially after the decolonisation wave following the Second World
War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Similarly, ref-
erendums related to partial sovereignty also exhibit some distinctive trends.
Until roughly the 1950s most of these referendums were associated with ter-
ritorial changes in the U.S. Since then, however, there has been a marked rise
in referendums related to territorial reconﬁgurations within the nation-state.
This is especially the case since the 1970s, a trend that was described in our
discussion related to the self-determination referendums in cluster 8. Another
distinctive feature is the rise of the pooled sovereignty referendum since the
1970s. Again, this can be easily explained by the referendums generated as a
result of the process of European integration.
Referendum Outcomes
Next we will take a look at the outcomes of sovereignty referendums. Speciﬁc-
ally, we will provide some tentative answers to two rather broad but interlinked
questions. First, to what extent do sovereignty referendums tend to come out
in favour of a sovereignty reallocation? And, second, by what share of the vote?
Answering these general questions requires some data pre-processing. Most
26
referendum questions follow the format: are you in favour of X? For instance,
the ballot question in Latvia's 1991 independence referendum read: Are you in
favour of a democratic and independent Republic of Latvia? In such instances
a `yes' vote entails a change from the status quo towards a new sovereignty
arrangement. However, in some cases the referendum question is reversed in
terms of the sovereignty issue at stake. Here a yes vote entails the status quo
rather than a change in sovereignty allocation. The 1975 UK referendum on
withdrawal from the EC is a good example. The question was formulated as
such: Do you think that the United Kingdom should stay in the European
Community? To get the share of referendums in favour of a sovereignty real-
location and the vote share in favour of a change from the status quo, we
re-coded all outcomes accordingly.101
Before we turn to some of the descriptive statistics it is necessary to take
into account at least three issues. First, sovereignty referendums are frequently
held in undemocratic contexts that are far from being free and fair. In quite a
few cases referendums are also likely to be outright rigged. Hitler's Anschluss
referendum, the series of referendums triggered in Moldova's breakaway region
of Transnistria and the recent (though out-of-sample) referendum on Russia's
annexation of Crimea are all obvious examples.
Second, even when overwhelmingly passed, referendums are evidently not
always implemented. This is especially true of referendums that were unilat-
erally staged by separatists. Despite the approval of independence in a large
number of Catalan municipalities between 2009 and 2011 and, more recently,
in the regional vote of November 2014, for the time being Catalonia is still part
of Spain. Similarly, despite referendums to the contrary, both Abkhazia and
South Ossetia are still de jure part of Georgia.
Finally, sovereignty referendums seem to involve a good deal of political
101Note that some referendums required a qualiﬁed majority. For instance, Montenegro's
2006 independence referendum required a turnout of more than 50 per cent as well as a 55 per
cent majority. The results presented in Figure 8 account for qualiﬁed majority requirements.
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instrumentality. Critically, they can be staged for diﬀerent motives and may
perform diﬀerent functions, depending on who controls them102 and who is
the initiator.103 In particular, sovereignty referendums can be triggered by
actors who want to further a sovereignty reallocation (e.g. Tudjman with his
1991 referendum on Croatia's independence) as well as by actors who wish
to avert one (e.g. Gorbachev trying to counter secessionist threats with his
1991 all-Union referendum). While the latter is less frequent, the outcomes in
both our examples were unsurprising (Tudjman's referendum favoured secession
while Gorbachev's resulted in a pyrrhic victory for the unionists). Initiation is
particularly important for sovereignty referendums because it can be pivotal in
determining which demos gets to vote. For instance, Gorbachev's referendum
would most likely have had a very diﬀerent outcome had those who were the
primary object of the referendum (the secession-minded Baltics and Georgia)
been directly asked rather than staging a Union-wide referendum.
With such provisos regarding outcomes in mind, let us start with the most
general ﬁnding presented in the left panel of Figure 8, which shows the propor-
tion of referendums in favour of a sovereignty reallocation across the categories
in descending order.104 Most sovereignty referendums clearly pass and by quite
an overwhelming rate. There is one notable exception to this general trend:
supranational withdrawal referendums. Yet, as argued above, we should note
that there are only three cases in this category. Two of these failed (the UK's
withdrawal from the EC and Spain's from NATO), which in both cases was in
alignment with the initiators' intentions.
102Smith (1976).
103Morel (2007).
104Only 11 types are shown because one categorysupranational repatriation
referendumsis a theoretical one with no empirical correlate and because both the num-
ber of passed referendums and the yes-share is undeﬁned in multi-option referendums. A
further 28 referendums, mostly of the transfer type, had to be excluded since they involve
more than one option other than the status quo. Note that there is a count issue since
the results of some of the separately coded referendums depend directly on each other. For
instance, the 1996 referendums in Berlin and Brandenburg on their merger required a yes-
vote in both states. The results do not change signiﬁcantly if these separately coded but
interlinked referendum events are counted as single observations.
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[Figure 8 about here]
The right panel in Figure 8 provides for a more nuanced assessment. The
box plots indicate the per cent of voters who opted in favour of the sover-
eignty reallocation, again by categories and in descending order.105 Apart from
the supranational withdrawal category, the vote share in favour of change is
predominantly clustered above the ﬁfty per cent threshold. In particular, the
ﬁrst category on irredentist separation has a very distinctive box plot with an
extremely high median vote share close to 100 per cent. This is because it
is a relatively small category of only 22 cases106 that includes a large share
of unilateral votes staged by separatists themselves, such as the Greek Cyp-
riot community's referendum on a merger with Greece in 1950, the Croatian
Krajina's referendum on merging with Serbia in 1991 and the 1992 referendum
in South Ossetia on a merger with Russia. Irredentist separation referendums
apart, there is a notable spread in most categories, as can be seen from the
width of the boxes representing the ﬁrst and third quartiles.
The box plots also reveal some signiﬁcant outliers that are of interest, plot-
ted as circles in the graph. The most extreme case involves the irredentist
separation category: Northern Ireland's 1973 border boll, a popular vote on
remaining with the UK that was boycotted by the Catholic minority. Nearly
99 per cent were in favour of maintaining the union, which is exactly what
the organisers wanted. A second category with some signiﬁcant outliers is
the autonomy category. Most autonomy referendums are clearly approved, al-
though there are some outliers that failed such as Wales in 1979. Another
interesting outlier is in the supranational accession category: the rather unique
case of Crimea holding a unilateral referendum against Ukraine joining NATO
in 2006. As with the Northern Ireland case, the outcomeapproximately 99
per cent against joiningwas exactly what the organisers intended.
105Compared to the left panel, the N decreases by 55 due to missing information on the
yes-share.
106Data on the yes-share is available for 20 of the 22 cases.
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To conduct a more systematic analysis of referendum outcomes would neces-
sitate much richer contextual information, for instance on the political dynamics
surrounding a decision to call a referendum, the motives of the initiator, po-
tential legal constraints (if any), the role of external actors, to name but a few
variables which we unfortunately lack. Acquiring such information, especially
for some of the historical cases, was well beyond the scope of the data collection
exercise. Insofar as any tentative conclusions can be derived, it is that refer-
endums on sovereignty allocations appear to be generally passed, if not always
implemented, and on average by a substantial share of the vote. Furthermore,
what our vignettes suggest is that referendum outcomes tend to be in line with
the intentions of their initiators.
Discussion
We have argued that existing compilations of sovereignty referendums tend to
suﬀer from several weaknesses. Many of the problems stem from conceptual
vagueness, which led to inconsistent coding decisions regarding what is and is
not a sovereignty referendum as well as incompatible and typically rather athe-
oretical typologies. Furthermore, existing compilations tend to have incomplete
coverage of the phenomenon. We noted that this is due to the over-reliance on
the same historical sources and a lack of original research drawing on alternat-
ive data sources; thus, systematic omissions in the historical records have been
compounded over time. A case in point is the neglect of most of the U.S. cases
in the preceding centuries, itself a consequence of their explicit omission in one
of the most-oft-cited historical treatises. This has led to erroneous statements,
such as the claim that the 1791 referendum in Avignon and Comtat Venaissin
constitutes the ﬁrst sovereignty referendum in the modern era. It was not the
ﬁrst; indeed it was preceded by Massachusetts' 1776 referendum on the Declar-
ation of Independence, amongst others.
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Aiming to ameliorate existing compilations, we presented a new data set of
sovereignty referendums that draws on an improved conceptualisation, replic-
able coding criteria and a much richer set of sources. The Contested Sovereignty
data set identiﬁes 602 sovereignty referendums between 1776-2012, more than
double the number in existing lists, and comes with a new, theory-driven ty-
pology of the phenomenon based on two dimensions. First, we distinguished
between three aspects of sovereignty that can be at stake in referendums, what
we called the scope dimension. Second, we outlined the directional nature of
a sovereignty reallocation, what we called its logic. These two overarching di-
mensions yielded a sovereignty referendum typology of six basic categories (and
twelve types) as well as a mixed residual category.
In the exploratory analysis, we highlighted an increasing use of the referen-
dum to decide sovereignty matters. Furthermore, we identiﬁed eight relatively
coherent referendum clusterssets of sovereignty referendums related to broad
macro-historical processeswhich together account for almost 90 per cent of
referendum activity. We then looked at aggregate patterns over time and space,
which suggested three main conclusions. First, the referendum had essentially
been a North American and European phenomenon for nearly two centuries.
However, after the Second World War the sovereignty referendum has become
a truly globalised tool spreading to most world regions. Second, in terms of
the principles of sovereignty at stake, there has been a sharp increase in the
number of referendums on sovereignty reallocations to entities either below or
above the nation-state since about the 1950s. Third, in terms of the logic of
the sovereignty reallocation the most important ﬁnding is this: whereas the
distribution of integrative referendums has remained fairly constant over the
entire time period (despite a recent upward trend), disintegrative referendums
are predominantly a post-1945 phenomenon. The tremendous spike in the fre-
quency of disintegrative referendums is interesting not least because they also
tend to be the most conﬂictual type of referendum.
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Finally, we took a ﬁrst look at referendum outcomes. Insofar as any con-
clusion can be drawn from our tentative analysis it was this: most referendums
turn out in favour of the sovereignty reallocation at stake, with many cases ex-
hibiting very high approval rates. Referendum outcomes should be interpreted
with care, however. In many instances referendums are staged in undemocratic
contexts and even when this is not the case there is often a high degree of
political instrumentality in opting for the referendum. Indeed, our vignettes
oﬀered examples of how referendum outcomes were in line with the preferences
of the political elites who staged the referendums.
Our speculations on this matter, and the extent to which political instru-
mentality holds across other referendum categories more generally, would neces-
sitate systematic empirical testing. That analysis has been beyond the scope
of this paper, yet it does point to an exciting line of research, one that also
raises a host of ancillary questions. These include investigating the conditions,
democratic or otherwise, under which sovereignty referendums are held. Or,
examining under what conditions sovereignty referendums lead to durable out-
comes and, in contrast, when they may be associated with an escalation of
conﬂict. It is a research agenda that the scholarly community has only begun
to address and one we hope will be facilitated by our new data set.
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Figure 1: Scope dimension
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Figure 2: Sovereignty referendum typology
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Figure 3: Decade-wise referendum frequencies (17762009)
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Figure 4: Referendum frequencies by type
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Figure 5: Region-wise referendum frequencies
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Note: The graph shows smoothed annual referendum frequencies based on kernel-weighted
local polynomial regression (bandwidth = 4).
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Figure 6: Referendum frequencies by sovereignty logic
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Note: The graph shows smoothed annual referendum frequencies based on kernel-weighted
local polynomial regression (bandwidth = 4).
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Figure 7: Referendum frequencies by sovereignty scope
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Figure 8: Referendum outcomes
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reallocation at stake and the right panel the vote share in favour of the sovereignty
reallocation at stake.
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